

Message Text

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ORIGIN PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-12 EA-07 NEA-10 IO-13 ISO-00
ACDA-07 ERDA-05 ARA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NASA-01 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02
PA-01 PRS-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 /131 R

DRAFTED BY PM/DCA: MARIETTI: MJT
APPROVED BY PM: RBARTHLOMEW
ACDA: JTWOMBL Y
EA/RA: LMCNUTT
EUR/SOV: SMCCALL
AF/I: USTRAUS
NEA/RA: RHOBBS
DOD: TGORMAN

-----051282 240127Z /72

R 230158Z JUL 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
USINT BAGHDAD
AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI
AMEMBASSY DOHA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMCONSUL KARACHI

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AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY MANAMA
AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO
AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
AMEMBASSY SANA
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMEMBASSY VICTORIA
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
USCINCEUR
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
CINCPACFLT
CINCUSNAVEUR
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MILITARY ADDEES ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652:

TAGS: PARM, XO

SUBJECT: US-SOVIET TALKS ON THE INDIAN OCEAN
REF: STATE 170463

1. FIRST ROUND OF US-SOVIET TALKS ON INDIAN OCEAN ARMS
LIMITATIONS TOOK PLACE IN MOSCOW JUNE 22-27. PRIOR TO
INITIAL MEETING US CONSULTED WITH ALLIES AND SINCE RETURNING
FROM MOSCOW WE HAVE CONDUCTED FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH
ALLIES AND SELECTED LITTORAL STATES. IN ADDITION WE HAVE
INDICATED TO THE UN AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN
THAT WE WILL INFORM IT OF IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS THAT MAY
HAVE A BEARING ON ITS WORK. ACCORDINGLY, WE WILL BE
PROVIDING THE COMMITTEE WITH A BRIEF GENERAL DESCRIPTION
OF RESULTS OF MOSCOW MEETING (REFTEL).

2. THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF THE MOSCOW MEETING IS PROVIDED FOR EMBASSY'S BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY. IT INCLUDES DETAILS THAT WE HAVE SHARED WITH ONLY A FEW OF OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS. POSTS LOCATED IN STATES WITH WHICH WE HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS ON THIS ISSUE SHOULD LIMIT THEIR DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE OF US-SOVIET TALKS TO SCOPE CONTAINED IN PREVIOUS GUIDANCE. OTHER POSTS MAY DRAW ON US LETTER TO AD HOC COMMITTEE CONTAINED REFTEL IF ASKED FOR COMMENT ON COURSE OF US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS.

3. BEGIN SUMMARY: MOSCOW TALKS WERE SERIOUS, POSITIVE, AND NON-POLEMICAL. THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN LATE SEPTEMBER OR EARLY OCTOBER, BUT THE EXACT DATE
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AND VENUE HAVE NOT YET BEEN DECIDED. OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN INITIAL ROUND OF TALKS WERE TO EXPLORE WHETHER THE SOVIETS WERE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN SEEKING AN INDIAN OCEAN ARMS LIMITATIONS AGREEMENT, AND TO MAKE CLEAR OUR OWN SERIOUSNESS. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUS, BUT THAT THERE ARE MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOVIET APPROACH AND OURS, AND THAT LENGTHY NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE REQUIRED BEFORE AN AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE. BOTH SIDES ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CURRENT US AND SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN INDIAN OCEAN IS NOT AT A HIGH LEVEL AND THAT THERE IS A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TOWARDS ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD PREVENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ESCALATING ARMS RACE. US OBJECTIVE IS TO SEEK IN THE FIRST INSTANCE A STABILIZATION OF US AND SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY AND PRESENCE. ONCE STABILIZATION IS ACHIEVED WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER MOVING TOWARDS REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY PRESENCE. THE LEVEL OF MILITARY PRESENCE WHICH WOULD BE PERMITTED UNDER A STABILIZATION AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS THE NATURE AND TIMING OF ANY SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS ARE MATTERS WHICH MUST BE DETERMINED IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

4. A COMMON THREAD THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THEIR CONCERN THAT THE US IS ENGAGING IN THE BUILDING UP OF AN INFRASTRUCTURE TO SUPPORT STRATEGIC FORCES CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE SOVIET UNION. THEY DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF FORCES WHICH THEY CONSIDERED RELATED TO REGIONAL INTERESTS (AND THEY EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZED THE US INTEREST IN ENSURING SECURITY OF SEA LANES FOR COMMERCIAL AND OIL TRAFFIC) AND OTHER FORCES WHICH--THEY ASSERTED--COULD STRIKE THE SOVIET HOMELAND. THEY PRESSED FOR A BAN ON SSBN'S, B-52'S AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. WE REPLIED THAT OUR PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS NOT A
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THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION; THAT WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE BANNING OF SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS; BUT THAT GENERAL NAVAL LIMITS WOULD ALSO CONSTRAIN SYSTEMS THE SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT.

5. THE SOVIETS STATED THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE FORCES AND FACILITIES OF US ALLIES IN THE REGION. THEY ALSO SOUGHT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF US FORCES IN ADJACENT AREAS, SUCH AS THE PHILIPPINES, WHICH THEY CLAIMED WOULD ALLOW THE US TO SURGE RAPIDLY INTO THE AREA. THE US REJECTED THESE SOVIET POSITIONS. WE SAID THE TALKS ARE BILATERAL AND DO NOT CONCERN THE

MILITARY FORCES OF OTHER EXTERNAL STATES WHICH HAVE THEIR OWN INTERESTS TO PROTECT IN THE REGION; OR OF THE LITTORAL STATES, AND THAT WE ARE ONLY WILLING TO DISCUSS OUR FORCES PRESENT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, NOT ADJACENT AREAS.

6. ON OTHER ISSUES THE SOVIETS WERE SOMEWHAT MORE FLEXIBLE.

A. WE PROPOSED A DEFINITION OF THE AREA FOR PURPOSES OF NAVAL LIMITS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ALL OF THE WATERS ENCLOSED BY THE ARC FORMED; ON THE WEST, BY THE EASTERN COAST OF AFRICA; ON THE NORTH, BY THE SOUTHERN COAST OF ASIA; AND, ON THE EAST, BY THE MALAY PENINSULA, ACROSS THE STRAIT OF MALACCA TO SUMATRA ALONG THE WESTERN AND SOUTHERN SHORE OF INDONESIA TO 123 DEGREE EAST AND THEN SOUTH ALONG THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN COAST. THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE THE RED SEA AND THE PERSIAN GULF. THE SOVIETS DISAGREED OVER WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE NEAR AUSTRALIA, PUSHING TO INCLUDE MORE OF THE WATERS OFF THE SOUTHERN AND NORTHERN COASTS OF AUSTRALIA.

B. SHIP DEPLOYMENTS--BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A LIMITATION ON SHIP DEPLOYMENTS MEASURED IN TERMS OF SOME COMBINATION OF SHIP DAYS AND TON DAYS

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THERE WAS DISAGREEMENT ON THE TYPES OF SHIPS TO BE INCLUDED AS AUXILIARIES IN ANY LIMITATION AGREEMENT, WITH THE US PRESSING TO INCLUDE ALL SHIPS WHICH SUPPORT A NAVAL PRESENCE, WHILE THE SOVIETS PROPOSED A MORE LIMITED DEFINITION.

C. SUPPORT FACILITIES. THE SOVIETS INITIALLY PRESSED

FOR THE "DISMANTLING" OF DIEGO GARCIA. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE SECURITY OF US TENURE THERE PUTS THIS FACILITY IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY FROM OTHER FACILITIES IN THE AREA. THE US MADE CLEAR IT WOULD NOT "DISMANTLE" DIEGO GARCIA, AND COUNTERED THAT THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT WHETHER

OR NOT THE US OR THE SOVIET UNION "CONTROL" A BASE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN, BUT RATHER THAT BOTH MAKE USE OF FACILITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN TO SUPPORT THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITIES. WE SAID WE WERE READY TO CONSIDER LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF DIEGO GARCIA ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF FACILITIES BY BOTH SIDES. THE SOVIETS ADMITTED THAT THEY MAINTAINED A COMMUNICATIONS STATION AND DRY DOCK IN BERBERA, SOMALIA, AND USED SOME OTHER FACILITIES THERE (ALTHOUGH THEY CONTINUED TO CLAIM THAT THESE OTHER FACILITIES ARE UNDER SOMALI, NOT SOVIET CONTROL). THE SOVIETS AT THE END STATED THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER LIMITATIONS ON THEIR USE OF SOMALI FACILITIES AS PART OF AN AGREEMENT.

7. IN SUMMARY, SOVIETS LAID OUT MAXIMALIST POSITION WHICH THEY WILL HAVE TO FALL BACK FROM IT THERE IS TO BE PROGRESS. BUT THEY ARE CLEARLY INTERESTED IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD MEET SOME OF THEIR SECURITY CONCERNS. THE US MADE CLEAR IT WOULD NOT ACCEPT UNEQUAL RESTRICTIONS NOR ANY LIMITATIONS THAT INFRINGE ON THE INTERESTS OF OUR
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FRIENDS OR ALLIES. VANCE

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Message Attributes

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Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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TAGS: PARM, XO, US, UR
To: AMMAN ABU DHABI MULTIPLE
Type: TE
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